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Constructivism about some domain of normative facts understands these facts as the
outcome of some procedure which in turn plays a constitutive role: It is not meant to track
independent normative facts; rather being the outcome of some procedure is what
constitutes those facts in the first place. Constructivism thus seems to recommend itself
by its metaphysical modesty—unlike realism it can dispense with postulating a realm of
independent normative facts and all the familiar metaphysical and epistemological
problems connected with it. While it shares this nihilistic stance towards independent
normative facts with expressivism, constructivism, unlike expressivism, does not simply
deny the very existence of normative facts: They do exist—in the sense that they are
brought about by our volitional activity.
Now constructivism in its local form is a familiar phenomenon in practical philosophy:
Rawls famously tries to construct the norms of justice by referring to principles that define
the basic structure of a society that self-interested agents would choose behind a veil of
ignorance. The main focus of the present collection of essays, however, is on global
constructivism which pursues a much more ambitious agenda: According to global
constructivists all normative facts (i.e. not just those of some particular normative realm
like justice or morality) are the upshot of some process of construction. By its very
structure global constructivism raises an immediate problem: How is normativity sup-
posed to be brought about by a process that—on pain of circularity—is neither allowed
to presuppose some independent normative truths as input (as local forms of construc-
tivism do) nor to be guided by independent normative requirements? Global construc-
tivists try to address this problem by focusing on the deliberative, first-person perspective
of the agent. The Kantian branch of global constructivism, represented, for instance, by
Christine Korsgaard, relies on the basic idea that the normative principles that govern the
will are constitutive of it in the first place—therefore they are simply not in need of some
external grounding and the problem of circularity is avoided. Whoever wills anything at
all is ipso facto subject to the constitutive principles of his very willing. A relatively recent,
Humean branch of global constructivism rejects this ambitious transcendental search for
constitutive principles of the will. According to Sharon Street as perhaps the most
influential proponent of Humean global constructivism ‘the substantive content of an
agent’s normative reasons is a function of his or her particular, contingently given,
evaluative starting point’ (p. 41). For someone with a sufficiently rotten evaluative starting
point there might simply be no moral reasons at all—pace Kant mere practical reason is
unable to generate any substantial values or norms (like the categorical imperative). Street
rightly complains that Kantian global constructivism has widely been equated with global
constructivism per se so that possible alternatives are easily overseen (cf. p. 42); in his
contribution, for instance, Jay Wallace—as if to implicitly affirm this diagnosis—takes
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Korsgaardian Kantian constructivism pars pro toto for his discussion of three structural
problems for constructivism in general.
The essays collected in the present volume focus (i) on a critical discussion of the status
of global constructivism as a major contender within the theory of normativity and
metaethics as well as (ii) on an exploration of both the structural features of global
constructivism and of the specific, Kantian or Humean, forms it takes in contemporary
debates:
As to (i) it is controversial whether constructivism forms an independent position in
its own right rather than, as Michael Ridge succinctly puts it, ‘a riff on a familiar tune
rather than a whole new song’ (p. 156). According to Ridge, for instance, Sharon Street’s
Humean constructivism collapses into ‘a sophisticated version of metaethical subjectiv-
ism’ (p. 157). Normative facts according to Street are constituted by the fact that the
respective normative judgments (i.e. that X is a reason to Y for A) stand in an appropriate
relation to (Street speaks of ‘withstanding scrutiny from’) the agent’s other relevant
judgments. After a careful discussion of how best to understand the ontology of primitive
normative judgments that in Street’s picture provide the input for the construction
process, Ridge suggests understanding them as desire-like entities with a world-to-mind
direction of fit: Ordinary normative judgments do not express these desires (thus Streetian
constructivism does not collapse into straightforward expressivism) but in a familiar
subjectivistic way report which of those withstand the scrutiny of the agent’s other
desire-like entities. James Lenman, however, disagrees: He suggests recasting Street’s
Humean constructivism in expressivist terms; that strikes him as being not just a
convincing way to provide an adequate account of the ontology of normative judgments
but also as systematically attractive: Properly understood expressivism and constructiv-
ism are not only not incompatible—they actually lend support to each other: With regard
to morality, for instance, constructivism provides expressivism with a convincing account
of moral justification; expressivism on the other hand provides constructivism with an
overall theory of how moral discourse and moral agency make sense in the first place (cf.
p. 224). Humean constructivism thus seems to tread a rather fine line between collapsing
into expressivism and, while preserving its independence, providing it with a welcome
complement. Kantian constructivism in its turn runs the risk of collapsing not into
expressivism but into realism: Street, for instance, charges Kantian constructivism with
coming dangerously close to committing a mistake ‘less severe than the realist’s, but still
a mistake, and in the same ballpark’ (p. 56) by trying to defend the categorical character
of normative requirements. Constructivism thus still faces very serious problems to
stabilize itself as an independent position against both realism and expressivism.
Even if these problems could be overcome, constructivism still has to address diffi-
culties that arise from the very logic of its position.
Michael Bratman confronts constructivism with the so-called ‘problem of alignment’
(p. 81): Constructivism takes its starting point from the first-person perspective of the
agent—but it remains an open question ‘whether the pressures from the general con-
structivism will align with the pressures from the theory of agency’ (ibid.). Street’s
Humean constructivism, for instance, takes normative judgments as constitutive of the
agent’s perspective and as the crucial input for the constructive process that is supposed
to generate reasons for her. Bratman, however, points to the fact that not all normative
judgments constitute the agent’s standpoint (for instance Huck Finn’s judgment that he
should turn in Jim should be discounted in favor of his emotional resistance against doing
so) and that there are other kinds of attitudes besides normative judgments (for instance
attitudes of caring and love) that do define that standpoint. The commitments that
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constitute the agent’s standpoint thus seem to be more like intentions to treat something
as a reason instead of judgments about reasons; the former, unlike the latter, for instance,
are not subject to demands of intersubjective convergence.
Jay Wallace discusses three further problems global constructivism faces: According to
Wallace the charge of equivocating between psychological and normative force might be
warded off by the constructivist by the dialectical point that even the critic who raises
it is already committed to endorsing the authority of normative considerations in so far
as they are constitutive of willing itself (thus leaving no room for discrediting them as
being mere psychological forces). The charge of bootstrapping exploits the gap between
actual attitudes of normative endorsement of normative requirements and the objective
normativity of those requirements. Here the constructivist might, according to Wallace,
successfully appeal to some process of idealization—normative facts are to be constructed
not out of actual attitudes but out of the attitudes that would be formed by some suitable
procedures of rational reflection. But what—and that leads to the third problem, that of
the possibility of error—about those procedures themselves; are we really entitled to rely
on them? The ready answer of the constructivist Kantian-style is of course that we already
rely on them in the first place because they are constitutive of the activity of deliberation
itself. From within the deliberative point of view it is therefore impossible to disregard
their authority and ask for their normative credentials. But as Wallace contends, (i) only
very few and rather formal principles like that of non-contradiction will meet such a
demanding criterion; (ii) the problem of bootstrapping raises its ugly head again—the
actual endorsement of procedural standards seems to confer authority on them; (iii) cases
of recalcitrant irrationality in which someone recognizes those procedural standards but
still sticks to her first-order attitudes that violate them (and she is perfectly aware that
they do so, but simply does not care) still linger—here again constructivism runs the risk
of collapsing either into a form of psychologistic existentialism (strictly speaking there is
no such thing as recalcitrant irrationality—rationality simply loses its grip in such cases)
or into a form of realism that allows to stick to the verdict of irrationality but reintroduces
normative facts utterly independent of any deliberative activity.
Tim Scanlon explicitly denies that ‘a plausible constructivist account of reasons for
action in general can be given’ (p. 237). He thus rejects global constructivism in both its
Kantian and its Humean version (whereas he himself of course famously defends a local
constructivism about morality). In a very condensed line of argument (pp. 237–41)
Scanlon raises doubts both about the ambitious Kantian project of constructing substantial
requirements like the categorical imperative out of transcendental presuppositions of
agency and about less demanding conceptions of practical rationality: For instance the
process of seeking reflective equilibrium in one’s beliefs about x according to Scanlon
resists a constructivist interpretation as constituting truths about x. Reflective equilibrium
can be reached in many, sloppy or irresponsible, ways; therefore the process of reaching
the reflective equilibrium itself has to rely on normative facts so as to distinguish between
good and bad ways of realizing it; some normative truths thus always lie in the back of
the proposed constructivist procedure and thus undermine its global pretentions.
Robert Stern’s contribution takes a place apart by focusing on one of the key
arguments—that from autonomy—that many constructivists wield against their realist
opponents: The basic idea of the argument is that the truth of moral realism would
undermine autonomy; being guided by an external evaluative dimension of reality seems
prima facie incompatible with genuine self-government. Since the realist will hardly be
tempted simply to dismiss any claims on making room for autonomy within her position,
the argument carries considerable dialectical force; which makes it even more surprising
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that the argument has received relatively little explicit attention in recent debates. Stern
carefully distinguishes three distinct forms which the argument of autonomy can take and
evaluates them as to their respective force. In its most convincing form the argument
relies on the idea that morality is a matter of obligation; obligation, however, seems to
presuppose a legislator that makes moral norms binding; such an external lawgiver,
however, is incompatible with the idea of autonomy. The realist, however, can quite easily
dodge the argument even in this form by restricting his realism to the right and conceding
the obligatory to his opponents, a strategy already adumbrated by Kant (who derives the
obligatory force of moral demands from the contingent features of finite human beings;
such a force simply does not exist for a genuinely holy will).
As to (ii) many of the contributions to the volume do pioneering work in deepening
our understanding of both the generic features of global constructivism and its various,
Kantian or Humean versions. Yonatan Shemmer suggests not only a very useful tax-
onomy of constructivist positions (cf. p. 161ff.) but provides a lucid discussion of
coherence (as opposed to mere consistency) as a key principle that governs the activity
of norm construction. Special emphasis is given to the question of how to justify the
priority given to existing reasons over those one considers adopting—such a priority
seems to be both indispensable for protecting the diachronic stability of the self and
normatively questionable in so far as it ‘legitimizes a despotism of our present self over
our future self’ (p. 160). Aaron James joins the Korsgaardian project of identifying
constitutive principles but disagrees with her voluntaristic approach: Instead of looking
for constitutive principles for the activity of choice James pursues a deliberately intellec-
tualist approach (cf. p. 69) that tries to identify the constitutive principles of ‘ “practical
reasoning” not as action per se, but as a species of judgment, guided by imperatives of
thought [. . .]’ (p. 69). Valerie Tiberius sketches the outline of a whole new, though rather
less ambitious version of constructivism than those defended by Korsgaard or Street: Her
so-called wise judgment constructivism tries to understand the normative notion of good
all-in reasons by appeal to the equally normative notions of wisdom and the norms
constitutive of wise judgment (which Tiberius classifies as aretaic ones, cf. 206). In her
contribution to the volume, Sharon Street, who has set the agenda of a considerable part
of the present debate on constructivism, not only develops an impressive internal critique
of Korsgaard’s argument for a Kantian constructivism but also provides some valuable
clarifications on the way the bindingness of morality on us is to be understood within her
Humean framework: Our relationship with morality becomes just as contingent as the one
we have with our lover; we are aware that we could have fallen for quite a number of
different human beings without this awareness shaking our love for the one for whom we
have actually fallen. (Even if Street’s analogy can be made good, it of course provokes the
question why the contingent project of morality does find so many human beings that
actually fall for it—there are plenty of other fish in the sea after all!)
Constructivism in Practical Philosophy is without any doubt an outstanding collection of
essays that nobody working on the theory of rationality, normativity, and/or metaethics
can safely ignore. However, it gives the overall impression of constructivism (at least in
its global version) as a relative newcomer to the field that still has to answer some very
basic questions: (i) Is global constructivism a genuine position in its own right or is it just
a structurally unstable position that collapses either into expressivism or into some
familiar form of Kantian objectivism that have just received a fancy relabeling? (ii) Can
constructivism really make good on its promise of providing a general theory of the entire
normative realm by constructivist means? If not, does the focus on global constructivism
not simply distract attention away from the more modest, but perhaps more rewarding
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projects of constructing one part of the normative realm by building on materials from
another? (iii) By which rules is the process of norm-construction to be guided and how
exactly is their status to be defined (so as to avoid the related charges of bootstrapping
and of overly restricting the room for error)? Both the originality and the heterogeneity
of the approaches to those questions as they are assembled in the present volume attest
to the fact that the debate on constructivism is still much more groping for the right
questions to ask than settling for definite answers—which makes it philosophically even
more interesting.
Christoph Halbig
Institut für Philosophie
Universität Gießen
christoph.halbig@phil.uni-giessen.de
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De Boer takes the title of her learned, thoughtful book from the preface to the Phenom-
enology of Spirit, though not in a direct manner. The phrase she translates as ‘the
tremendous sway of the negative’ (p. 2)—‘die ungeheure Macht des Negativen’—is more
literally translated by Miller as ‘the tremendous power of the negative’ (Hegel 1969: 3,
p. 36/Hegel 1977: 19). De Boer’s silent substitution is suggestive, as the word ‘sway’ is
one that most would associate not with Hegel, but with Heidegger—most famously with
Heidegger’s pronouncement in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, ‘Enframing means
that way of revealing which holds sway [waltet] in the essence of modern technology and
which is itself nothing technological’ (Heidegger 1977: 20/Heidegger 2004: 24). Given that
de Boer is the author of Thinking in the Light of Time: Heidegger’s Encounter with Hegel, some
might be concerned that she is working from a text that is not quite Hegel’s. This worry
is largely unfounded, as de Boer is open about her wish to read Hegel against himself.1
On her account, there is in fact not one but two Hegels: the first a systematic, dialectical
thinker, and the second a tragic thinker who offers the best resources for an immanent
critique of the first. The critique is necessary and justified, on de Boer’s account, by virtue
of the close relation between Hegel’s dialectical system and what de Boer describes as the
characteristic and dangerous ‘optimism and self-complacency’ of modernity, its defining
faith in ‘necessary progress’ (pp. 2 and 195). This progressive improvement is understood
in the ‘prevailing paradigm of modernity’ (p. 1) as one in which any given issue or
problem is characterized in terms of a binary opposition in which the superior of the two
terms suppresses or eliminates the other. Tradition is subdued by progress, faith by
reason, terror by freedom, power by justice, the private by the public, and so on (p. 1).
Hegel, whose optimistic faith in history as the self-unfolding of Geist is exemplary here,
famously criticizes the tendency to understand things in terms of reified, clear-cut
oppositions; but he also exemplifies this process in his alternative, dialectical account of
the logic by which such oppositions are to be sublated. In each case, the lesser term will
be at once preserved and appropriated by the one that, in de Boer’s phrase, ‘holds sway’
over it. Faith, for instance, is not denied in the manner of the French Enlightenment, but
raised into a Reason which contains all that was true in the Christian teaching. Likewise,
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